What Is The Future of USCYBERCOM?
A recent Cyber Defense Review edition was dedicated to the discussion of capability reform
Did the US Use Cyber Power Against Venezuela?
The past week, the potential for cyber and kinetic military convergence came to the fore, with the US interactions with Venezuela. Numerous news outlets have speculated on how cyber technologies - for intelligence gathering and offensive operations - could have been utilised.
The BBC recently published a story focused on “The continued mysteries surrounding the intelligence operation to capture Maduro”. The article goes on to explain:
“The fact that the US Cyber Command was publicly thanked for its role in the operation has led to speculation that US military hackers got inside Venezuelan networks in advance to shut the grid down at the right moment - but details are limited.
The failure of Chinese and Russian air defences has also led to speculation of what kind of jamming or electronic warfare technology was deployed by the US in the air to aid the operation. The US Space Command, which operates satellites, also received credit for creating a “pathway” for the special forces to enter unseen.”
Polito had an article on 7th January more boldly entitled “Venezuela strike marks a turning point for US cyber warfare”. They again nodded to the sudden power outage that occurred prior to the physical landing of troops:
“Trump, at the same press conference, was more overt in his description of U.S. cyber involvement: “The lights of Caracas were largely turned off due to a certain expertise that we have,” he said. “It was dark, and it was deadly.”
Beyond these small-but-significant nods toward U.S. cyber power, details about how exactly the U.S. was able to pull off such a feat were slim. A spokesperson for the Pentagon declined to comment on the specifics of U.S. cyber operations in Venezuela, while a spokesperson for Cyber Command said it was “proud to support” the mission. A spokesperson for the White House did not respond to requests for comment.”
Of course, the details will never be known - for a long time yet - and a policy of strategic ambiguity supports a stance that denying the fact gains nothing - whilst loosely acknowledging some sort of cyber capability is a potential deterrent option and show of strength.
Whatever the underlying capability and success of it - which is difficult to measure - the structure, growth and operational involvement of USCYBERCOM is being hotly debated.
What Next for USCYBERCOM?
A recent special edition of the Cyber Defense Review tackled just this topic.
The Cyber Defense Review (CDR) describes themselves as:
“…an open-access, peer-reviewed, scholarly journal that serves as a forum for current and emerging research on cyber operations. Its focus is on strategy, operations, tactics, history, ethics, law, and policy in the cyber domain. CDR positions itself as a leading venue for interdisciplinary work at the intersection of cyber and defense, welcoming contributions from the military, industry, professional, and academic communities.”
Their most recent issue was a special edition focusing on the USCYBERCOM and the future of US cyber forces.
What Issues is USCYBERCOM Facing?
Other than restructure for restructuring’s sake, it seems there are some reasonable issues that are being discussed:
Insufficient Force Size: The current active-duty cyber workforce is considered too small to effectively manage the sheer volume and increasing sophistication of global cyber threats. This results in a significant gap between operational demand and available manpower.
Talent Recruitment and Retention: There is a persistent structural challenge in recruiting and retaining highly skilled technical talent. The government struggles to compete with the private sector, leading to a need to look “Beyond the Uniform” and develop better strategies for leveraging national cyber expertise.
Sub-optimal Management and Readiness: The current management framework is seen as needing modernization to ensure sustainable force readiness. Issues include:
Lack of codified maximum operational tempo thresholds, potentially leading to burnout.
Need for better alignment of technical personnel to demanding technical roles.
Insufficient integration of auxiliary units (National Guard and Reserve) into joint exercises.
These are some pretty complex issues to solve - and will be familiar with many large scale cyber operations teams - be they private sector or nation state.
What Can be Done?
The core debate in the CDR issue revolves around whether to simply reform and empower USCYBERCOM or to create an entirely new military branch for cyberspace.
The proposals for expansion fall into a few key areas:
1. Expansion of Cyber Force Size and Management
A primary recommendation is to significantly expand the active-duty cyber workforce, arguing that the current force is simply too small to manage the volume and sophistication of threats.
“Go Big” on Force Size: The proposal argues that the scale of malicious cyber activity far exceeds the capacity of the current military cyber forces. Expanding the force would help close the gap between operational demand and available manpower.
Management Reforms: Workforce expansion must be paired with management modernization to ensure sustainable readiness gains, which could include:
Codifying maximum operational tempo thresholds.
Adopting rotational assignment models.
Creating “force health” reporting metrics that link readiness to personnel workload.
Aligning technical personnel to demanding technical roles and reserving less complex tasks for less experienced individuals.
2. Reforming and Empowering USCYBERCOM
Many contributions suggest that incremental reform is the fastest, least risky, and most effective path, especially as USCYBERCOM is already increasing its capabilities.
Utilize New Authorities: Empowering USCYBERCOM to fully execute the authorities it already possesses, such as full training authority over cyber operational forces, is critical for standardization and interoperability.
Leverage Auxiliaries and Exercises: Incorporate National Guard, Reserve, and other auxiliary units, particularly by integrating them into joint exercises that involve foreign and domestic partners.
Avoid Disruptive Restructuring: Critics of a new Cyber Service warn it would be costly, slow, and counterproductive, risking years of turmoil, duplicating functions, and diverting scarce resources and expert personnel from current operations.
3. Reconnecting with the Private Sector
A structural challenge is the struggle to recruit and retain technical talent, leading to a proposal to look “Beyond the Uniform” by leveraging the national cyber workforce outside of the government.
Cyber Mission Support Framework (CMSF): This framework is proposed to reconnect uniformed forces with trusted, highly skilled cyber professionals in the private sector for scalable mission augmentation and, potentially, regulated cyber proxy operations.
Industry Collaboration: USCYBERCOM should foster deeper collaboration with the commercial industry, which dominates cyber defenses at home and abroad.
4. Radical Organizational Change
Other contributors argue that patchwork fixes are insufficient, advocating for a significant structural overhaul to fully expand capabilities.
Create a Separate Cyber Service: One option is to create a new, separate cyber service or military department—similar to the Space Force—to establish a unified career progression system and better align technical skills with advancement.
Revising Doctrine: Another suggestion is to revise U.S. doctrine to treat cyberspace as a battlespace and not merely a function that supports kinetic force.
It seems the continued hiring and structural challenges facing USCYBERCOM will continue as none of the suggested proposals are quick to implement. The ability to acknowledge “winning” narratives associated with “cyberwar” usage however, does bring some additional attention on the entire area - which may be good for the hiring apparatus, but ultimately makes integration and success metrics more complex.